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COMMENTS
EFFECT OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v.
CHADHA ON EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Three recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court, Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,1 Consumer Energy Council
v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,2 and Consumers Union v.
Federal Trade Commission,s have altered the balance of power between
Congress and the executive branch, invalidating a congressional check on
executive power which had been in use for over fifty years. In an opinion
in Chadha and by affirmance in the other cases, the Court held that
under the separation of powers doctrine4 the legislative veto violated the
presentment 5 and bicameral 6 requirements of the Constitution and
thereby intruded on the province of the executive branch. The effect of
these decisions extends far beyond the legality of the immigration, natu-
ral gas, and trade commission acts considered by the Court. There is
every indication in Chadha and in the memorandum opinion affirming
1. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
2. 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd mem. sub noam. Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumers Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
3. 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'd mem. sub noma. United States Senate v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
4. See, e.g., Consumer Energy Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d
425, 470-71 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("There is a common 'recognition of the intent of the Framers
that the powers of the three great branches of the National Government be largely separate
from one another.' ") (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976)), aff'd mem. sub
nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3 provide, in pertinent part-
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States . . . .Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Sen-
ate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjourn-
ment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same
shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be
repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the
Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
(emphasis added).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7. In addition to the references to joint action by both houses
of Congress found in § 7, § 1 provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives." (emphasis added). See Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2781.
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the other two cases that some 320 legislative veto provisions in approxi-
mately 210 laws 7 are now invalid. The specific impact of Chadha and its
progeny on the executive reorganization acts and possible congressional
alternatives to the legislative veto for controlling administrative agency
discretion are the subjects of this comment.
A. Definition and Purpose of the Legislative Veto
The term "legislative veto" encompasses a class of statutory mecha-
nisms designed to subject presidential and administrative agency action
to some additional form of legislative consideration and control.' The
types of agency actions reviewable by Congress through the veto mecha-
nism have included rulemaking procedures,9 simple adjudicative mat-
ters,10 and other discretionary acts by administrative agencies.' Congres-
sional adoption of veto provisions has extended beyond the executive
branch agencies to encompass actions by independent regulatory agencies
and commissions.2
Legislative veto provisions often include a required waiting period
before a rule or order can take effect, and have been used by Congress
7. Smith & Struve, Aftershocks of the Fall of the Legislative Veto, 69 A.B.A. J. 1258,
1258 (1983). Smith and Struve, together with Judge Antonin Scalia, prepared the ABA ami-
cus brief in Chadha. The authors present a cogent analysis that addresses in general terms
two themes developed in this comment: what effects the unconstitutional legislative veto
provisions have had on other statutory directives, and what alternative mechanisms of ad-
ministrative agency control are left unscathed for Congress to employ.
8. Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
467, 467 (1962).
9. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1982), defines rulemaking as an
"agency process for formulating, amending or repealing a rule.... ."
10. The adjudicative proceedings in Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2770-71, are a prime example of
the use of a legislative veto to block the decision of an administrative law judge. See infra
notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
11. Presidential restructuring of the federal bureaucracy through use of the executive re-
organization power delegated by Congress in the various reorganization acts is a case in
point. See infra notes 91-114 and accompanying text.
12. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is a pseudo-independent agency
vested by Congress with a degree of institutional autonomy and funded through separate
appropriations. However, it functions within the Department of Energy, an executive
branch agency. In contrast, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is situated outside of the
executive branch and is more typical of the independent agency mold. One of the prime
advantages of the independent agency is greater policy discretion and insulation from exec-
utive branch control. The drawbacks of the independent agencies, including such problems
as "agency failure" and lack of presidential or congressional policy coordination, are ad-
dressed by numerous commentators. See, e.g., Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administra-
tion, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1183 (1973); Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L.
REv. 47 (1969). See generally R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS
(1941). The question of how to control administrative agency action has been the major
impetus behind development of the legislative veto. See infra notes 20-21 and accompany-
ing text.
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either to ratify agency action or to amend proposed actions presented for
approval.' 3 The waiting period, by itself, does not render the legislative
review mechanism unconstitutional. 4 However, in the past, the submis-
sion of an agency decision for review was generally coupled with congres-
sional authority to disapprove the proposed action. If Congress failed to
act during the waiting period, the agency proposal became effective, un-
less affirmative approval by Congress or its committees was required by
statute.
15
The method of congressional ratification pursuant to the veto has va-
ried considerably over 50 years of use. The most common types of control
mechanisms have been the simple, or "one-House," resolution and the
concurrent, or "two-House," resolution. Neither simple nor concurrent
resolutions are submitted to the President for approval or veto.'" Since
the mid-1940s, Congress has also delegated the veto power to its standing
committees. 17 The three methods and their possible variations' s do not
allow Congress to amend actions subject to the veto. Congressional power
has generally been limited to disapproval of the proposed agency action
as presented. 9
Public perceptions of uncontrolled agency discretion have apparently
influenced many members of Congress to seek stricter controls over
agency accountability.20 Congressional leaders must balance the conflict-
ing pressures to, on the one hand, pass legislation with dispatch, and, on
13. Schauffier, The Legislative Veto Revisited, 8 PuB. POL'Y 296, 300-05 (1958).
14. See, e.g., Consumer Energy Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d
at 474 & n.206; Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 681 n.4 (D.C. Cir.) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting),
afl'd mem. sub noma. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977).
15. J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 204 (1st ed. 1964). An exam-
ple of a statute where affirmative action by Congress was required is found in the 1948
amendments to the Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 783, 52 Stat. 1206, a precursor of the dis-
puted veto provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. The 1948 amendment
prohibited the Attorney General from suspending deportation in all cases unless both
houses of Congress affirmatively approved the suspension request. See Ginnane, The Con-
trol of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L.
REv. 569, 583 (1953). The 1952 Act provided for both congressional approval and disap-
proval, depending on the class in which each suspension request belonged. Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 216-17 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1254 (1982)).
16. Ginnane, supra note 15, at 570 & n.l.
17. J. HARRIS, supra note 15, at 204-05.
18. Another possible method is to vest the veto power in a congressional committee chair-
man. See Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive,
63 CALIF. L. REv. 983, 987 & n.6 (1975).
19. J. HARRIS, supra note 15, at 204-05.
20. See, e.g., J. CARTER, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSsrHT -
TING His Vmws ON THE USE OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO, H.R. Doc. No. 357, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1978); 128 CONG. REc. H8719 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1982) (statements of Reps. Quillen
and Levitas).
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the other hand, control the extent to which administrative agencies "fill
in the gaps." The fact that agency rules and orders may "carry the force
of law without legislative consideration" means that Congress should not
abandon forever to agency discretion the promulgation of agency rules
that put citizens "in jeopardy of losing liberty or property without having
anyone elected by the people or answerable to them involved in the
process."21
Prior to Chadha other commentators questioned the persuasiveness of
these arguments.22 Congress, after all, does have alternative oversight and
control devices to curb agency abuse.23 Furthermore, aside from its con-
stitutional defects, the legislative veto mechanism may be inappropriate
in those areas where members of Congress lack the expertise or time re-
quired to make informed judgments. 24 In addition, Congress may improve
control over agency action by setting out a clear statement of congres-
sional intent in the enabling acts, and by insisting upon suitable qualifica-
tions for administrators whose appointments are subject to congressional
approva 2 5
Constitutional questions surrounding the veto have led executive
branch officials, presidents, and even some influential members of Con-
gress to suggest less suspect, if not more effective, methods of agency con-
trol.26 As Chief Justice Burger indicated in his Chadha opinion, some
eleven presidents since Woodrow Wilson have gone on record at some
point during their administrations challenging the constitutionality of
legislative vetoes.27 Despite this impressive opposition, no judicial deci-
sion challenging the legitimacy of the veto had ever been rendered.28
Without adverse judicial precedent, the legislative veto remained a much
21. 128 CONG. REc. H8719 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1982).
22. See, e.g., id. at H8717-19 (statement of Rep. Moakley). See generally Watson, supra
note 18, at 1048 et passim.
23. See infra note 125.
24. Schauffler, supra note 13, at 309.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 18, at 988-89 & nn. 9-12 (containing an abridged list of
challenges and alternatives to the veto offered by presidents and members of Congress); J.
CARTER, supra note 20, at 3.
27. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2779 & n.13.
28. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (challenge to veto provision in Federal
Election Campaign Act decided on ripeness grounds); accord, Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642
(D.C. Cir.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 421 U.S. 950 (1977) (challenge to a legis-
lative veto in Federal Election Campaign Act dismissed as unripe); see also McCorkle v.
United States, 559 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1977) (challenge to veto in Federal Salary Act dodged
by court on severability and right to relief grounds), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978); cf.
Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1941) (validity of "laying over" requirement, where
proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure remain before Congress for six months before
becoming effective, upheld). But see Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977)
(challenge to Federal Salary Act veto dismissed on necessary and proper clause grounds),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
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debated, yet often used, device in Congress' effort to control administra-
tive agency discretion.29
One of the most celebrated debates on the constitutionality of the veto
took place between President Franklin Roosevelt and Attorney General
(soon to be Supreme Court Justice) Jackson, prompting President
Roosevelt to render a legal "opinion" on a two-House veto provision in
the Lend Lease Act of 1940.30 The opinion, later revealed by Justice Jack-
son, 3 1 was unprecedented. But in Justice Jackson's own view, the consti-
tutionality of the veto "depend[ed] on whether the provision was to be
considered as a reservation or limitation by which the granted power
would expire ' 32 upon congressional action or whether it "was to be re-
garded as authorizing a repeal by concurrent resolution. '3 This underly-
ing issue of the definition of the legislative veto mechanism is precisely
what subsequent courts have wrestled with in addressing the constitu-
tionality issue.3 4 If the veto is seen as expiration of statutory authority for
agency proposals, then the delegation of decision making power to the
agency is based on continued congressional support. Administrative
agency action would thereby lack the force of law unless Congress ap-
proved or failed to disapprove a particular action by resolution. The ex-
tent to which the Supreme Court addresses this view will be discussed
later. 5
B. Use of the Legislative Veto
The modern day veto first appeared in the Legislative Appropriations
Act of 1932,3' following President Hoover's request for authority to reor-
ganize executive agencies.37 After the 1933 repeal of the veto provision in
29. See, e.g., 128 CONG. REc. H8719-40 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1982) (discussion of veto in rela-
tion to congressional reauthorization of the FTC).
30. Ch. 11, 55 Stat. 31 (1941).
31. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1353 (1953).
32. Id. at 1355.
33. Id.
34. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 257 (1976) (White, J., concurring); Atkins v. United
States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
35. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
36. Ch. 314, 47 Stat. 413-14 (1932).
37. J. HARRIS, supra note 15, at 207. President Hoover's attempt to reorganize the execu-
tive branch was in vain, however, as the lame-duck House of Representatives disapproved
all of Hoover's proposals. See H.R. Res. 334, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1932). Note that the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority Act, ch. 32, § 4, 48 Stat. 60 (1933) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 831c (1982)) established discretionary removal powers in Congress by concurrent resolu-
tion in addition to presidential authority to remove TVA board members for cause. The
Sixth Circuit discusses this provision in Morgan v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 115 F.2d 990
(6th Cir. 1940) in light of the President's authority to hire and fire. The method of removing
executive officers is tangential to the discussion here and is thus beyond the scope of this
comment.
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the Legislative Appropriations Act,38 Congress did not use the device
again until 1939 when it granted limited authority for executive
reorganization. 9
Justice White's dissenting opinion in Chadha40 discussed the wide-scale
use of the veto provision in 56 current statutes, some of which included
multiple veto provisions. 41 Other commentators seeking to develop a com-
prehensive list of the statutes containing veto provisions4' have noted the
increasing prevalence of the vetoes in recent legislation.4' In addition, in
the last four years, both the Senate44 and the House of Representatives 45
have considered expanding of the veto mechanism to cover all agency
rulemaking.
The increasing use of the veto provision and the lingering questions
over its constitutionality may have prompted judicial intervention by the
Court in Chadha. But whatever the underlying rationale for its sweeping
decision, the political questions regarding control of administrative agen-
cies still remain, 46 as do the questions regarding the legitimate methods of
control left available to Congress.
38. Amendments to the Legislative Appropriations Act of 1932, ch. 3, 48 Stat. 16 (1933).
39. Reorganization Act of 1939, ch. 36, 53 Stat. 561.
40. 103 S. Ct. at 2811-16.
41. The statutes containing legislative vetoes cover 1) foreign affairs and national secur-
ity, 2) budget, 3) international trade, 4) energy, 5) rulemaking, and 6) miscellaneous. Id. at
2811-16.
42. See, e.g., C. NORTON, 1976-77 CONGRESSIONAL AcTs AUTHORIZING PRIOR REVIEW, AP-
PROVAL, OR DISAPPROVAL OF PROPOSED EXECUTIVE ACTIONS and INTERiM REPORT ON THE Ex-
ERCISE OF CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW, DEFERRAL, AND DISAPPROVAL AUTHORITY OVER PROPOSED
ExEcuTvE ACTiONS, 1960-1975 (Congressional Research Service Studies), reprinted in Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act Amendments of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Agency Administration of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 808-50 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as APA Hearings]; Watson, supra note 18, at 1089-94 (partial compilation
since 1932).
43. See, e.g., Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2781 (citing Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A
Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.
REV. 323, 324 (1977) (finding the frequency of veto use increasing)); APA Hearings, supra
note 42, at 837 (1976 Congressional Research Service study identifying 351 resolutions of
congressional approval or disapproval between 1960-1975. Sixty-three of these became effec-
tive, and nearly two-thirds took effect in 1975 alone).
44. Legislative Veto Provisions, Hearing on S. 890 and S. 684 Before the Subcomm. on
Agency Administration of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
45. Staff of House Committee on Rules, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Recommendations on Es-
tablishment of Procedures for Congressional Review of Agency Rules 1, 35 (Comm. Print
1980).
46. See 129 CONG. REc. S9670-71 (daily ed. July 12, 1983) (remarks by Sen. Goldwater on
the continuing validity of the War Powers Resolution).
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H. THE Chadha DECISION
A. Factual and Procedural Considerations
Jagdish Rai Chadha petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit for review of a deportation order issued by the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service (INS).47 The INS order was made pursuant to a House
of Representatives resolution" disapproving an earlier INS suspension
order which had granted Chadha's request to remain in the United
States. The Ninth Circuit heard arguments on the case in April 1978, re-
assigned the case to a new panel in August 1980, and finally rendered its
decision on December 22, 1980.49 The court held that the one-House veto
of the INS suspension order was an unconstitutional violation of the sep-
aration of powers principle unjustified by Congress' article I power over
aliens.50
In its review of the INS deportation proceedings, the Ninth Circuit
found that Chadha, a native of Kenya and of East Indian descent, law-
fully entered the United States in 1966 via a British passport and ob-
tained a nonimmigrant student visa. Following completion of his studies,
Chadha's visa expired. In 1974 the INS issued Chadha an order to show
cause why he should not be deported.5 1
At a deportation hearing, Chadha conceded that he was deportable52
but requested a suspension of deportation pursuant to section 244(a)(1)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)." Section 244(a)(1) vests
47. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1980),
aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
48. H.R. Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 40800 (1975).
49. 634 F.2d at 408.
50. Id. at 433, 434. As Judge Kennedy indicated, article I of the Constitution provides in
pertinent part- "The Congress shall have Power... To establish a uniform Rule of Natu-
ralization,... [and] To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers.... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cis. 1, 4, 18. Note how the
Supreme Court addressed this same issue, i.e., Congress' apparent plenary power over immi-
gration questions and Congress' exclusive powers under the necessary and proper clause, in
its discussion of the political question doctrine. The Court did not dispute the congressional
authority; instead it focused on "whether Congress [had] chosen a constitutionally permissi-
ble means of implementing that power." 103 S. Ct. at 2779. In essence, this approach side-
stepped the question raised by the congressional amici: why should the courts have jurisdic-
tion over a political balancing of power between the executive and Congress? See 128 CONG.
REC. H8728 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1982) (excerpts from an amicus brief filed by Eugene Gress-
man for the House of Representatives and an article by James Sundquist on the veto). The
Court's handling of the political question doctrine eliminated the major stumbling block to
jurisdiction; it also foreshadowed the formalistic approach taken by Chief Justice Burger in
his majority opinion.
51. 634 F.2d at 411.
52. Section 241(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
(1982), defines the classes of aliens who are deportable.
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1982).
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authority in the Attorney General to suspend deportation and adjust the
status of an alien to allow him or her to apply for permanent residence.
Such suspensions are allowed where the alien
is deportable .. .; has been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the
date of such application, and proves that during all of such period he was
and is a person of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation
would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to
the alien or [to his other legally resident family members]."
The hearing officer found that Chadha met the requirements listed
above and ordered suspension of the deportation order pending review
and disapproval by Congress. 5  On December 12, 1975, Representative
Eilberg, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, initiated legislative re-
view by introducing, as required by statute, a resolution opposing the sus-
pension for Chadha and five other aliens. The unprinted resolution deny-
ing the grant of suspension was passed four days later without debate or
recorded vote. 0
Following exercise of the veto, Chadha's deportation proceedings were
reconvened and a final deportation order was entered. 57 Chadha objected
to the proceedings on the ground that the one-House veto provision in
section 244(c)(2)58 of the INA was unconstitutional. Both the immigration
judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) refused to consider
the constitutionality question, and the BIA dismissed Chadha's appeal
from the immigration judge's order.5 9
The House of Representatives and the Senate were the adverse parties
in Chadha's successful petition to the Ninth Circuit and defense before
54. Id.
55. 634 F.2d at 411.
56. H.R. Res. 926, supra note 48, at 40800. Chief Justice Burger questioned whether the
House generally, or Subcommittee Chairman Eilberg in particular, understood the action
being taken. His comment was based on review of a resolution introduced a year earlier by
Rep. Eilberg. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2771-72 n.3.
57. 103 S. Ct. at 2772.
58. Section 244(c)(2) provides, in pertinent part:
[I]f during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported [pursuant to §
244(c)(1)], or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the ses-
sion at which a case is reported, either the Senate or the House of Representatives
passes a resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the suspension of such
deportation, the Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien.... If, within
the time above specified, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives shall
pass such a resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings.
8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1976).
59. 103 S. Ct. at 2772.
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the Supreme Court.60 While the INS was the named party respondent
before the Ninth Circuit and the appellant to the Supreme Court, the
agency in fact sided with Chadha on the unconstitutionality of the veto
mechanism.6 1 Before reaching the merits, both courts raised and then dis-
posed of the procedural questions of jurisdiction and justiciability which
had led to the dismissal of previous cases challenging the veto. 2
Chadha presented to the courts a particularly strong example of why
Congress should not have the power to veto administrative agency action.
The evidence of minimal congressional understanding or consideration of
the veto used in Chadha's case was particularly damning, because
Chadha's right to remain in the United States was at stake. The conve-
nience of delegating the decision to the INS as a means of doing justice in
particular cases had led Congress to grant the INS authority to suspend
deportation." Congress, however, reluctant to leave the deportation de-
terminations entirely to administrative discretion and expertise, included
a veto provision in the INA." Some veto provisions, including those in
the executive reorganization acts, fall into Justice Jackson's category of
proposals lacking the force of law absent congressional approval. The INA
veto mechanism, however, combined with the dearth of congressional con-
sideration exemplified in Chadha, fits Jackson's alternative characteriza-
tion, i.e., an arbitrary repeal of administrative determinations through an
intrusive legislative oversight. 65
B. The Majority Opinion in Chadha
Mr. Chadha's situation gave the Supreme Court the ideal case to test
the constitutionality of the legislative veto. The arbitrariness of the veto
was clear, and Chief Justice Burger rejected as "arcane" the idea that
Chadha's suspension order was a mere proposal to Congress. 66 At each
step the Chief Justice declined to decide the case on non-constitutional
60. Id. at 2774 n.6.
61. Chadha illustrated yet another case in which the interests of "the United States" are
ambiguous. Professor Miller properly questioned the propriety of the Attorney General in
taking sides during a dispute between the executive branch and Congress over use of the
legislative veto. Although it is beyond the scope of this comment, this issue is one that will
probably linger long after Congress has forgotten the legislative veto. See Miller, Dames &
Moore v. Regan: A Political Decision by a Political Court, 29 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1104, 1121-
23 (1982). See also Miller & Bowman, Presidential Attacks on the Constitutionality of Fed-
eral Statutes: A New Separation of Powers Problem, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 51 (1979).
62. See cases cited supra note 28.
63. Mansfield, The Legislative Veto and the Deportation of Aliens, 1 PuB. AD. REv. 281,
284-86 (1941). Mansfield discusses the pre-1940 burden imposed on Congress by private
relief legislation. The volume of private immigrations bills before Congress reached a peak
of 526, but declined sharply following enactment of the Alien Registration Act of 1940.
64. Id. at 286.
65. See Jackson, supra note 31, at 1353, 1355.
66. 103 S. Ct. at 2787-88 & n.22.
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grounds, labelling the effect of changes in the law and in Chadha's mari-
tal status as speculative avenues of relief.67 This position is contrary to
the typical posture of the Court to construe statutes narrowly and
thereby avoid constitutional issues.68
The Court's analysis of INA section 244(c)(2) centered upon a strict
reading of the bicameral and presentment clauses in article 1.69 The Chief
Justice emphasized the concern expressed during the Constitutional Con-
vention debates that the legislative power be restrained by a system of
checks and balances. He argued that the procedural requirements for en-
acting a law, i.e., passage of a bill by both houses of Congress and pre-
sentment to the President, have served "essential constitutional func-
tions. '70 Finally, he concluded that the two clauses clearly embody "a
prescription for legislative action [which is limited to] a single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure. '71
Chief Justice Burger considered these procedural requirements in light
of the "legislative character" of section 244(c)(2).72 He examined the
"carefully defined exceptions" to presentment and bicameralism and
found that none applied to the one-House veto.73 In holding congressional
exercise of legislative power to strict limits of form and function, the
Chief Justice avoided the issue of independent constitutional grounds for
reaching the opposite result.74
C. Justice Powell's Concurrence
Although he concurred in the judgment in Chadha, Justice Powell ex-
pressed concern over the breadth of the decision and sought to limit the
holding.75 He interpreted the framers' intent behind the procedural re-
quirements as a general safeguard against assumption of judicial power
by the legislature.76 Justice Powell indicated that Congress may assume
67. Id. at 2776-77. Chief Justice Burger began his constitutional review with a presump-
tion of statutory validity, which he summarily abandoned in the next sentence. Id. at 2780.
68. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936). See also Clay
v. Sun Ins. Office, 363 U.S. 207 (1960); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 338 (1956).
69. See supra notes 5-6.
70. 103 S. Ct. at 2782-84.
71. Id. at 2784.
72. Id. at 2784-86.
73. The explicit extra-legislative functions available to Congress are 1) the impeachment
powers, 2) the review of presidential appointments, and 3) the treaty ratification power. Id.
at 2786-87.
74. See, e.g., Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1009 (1978) (veto in Salary Act valid under Congress' necessary and proper clause powers);
see also supra note 50.
75. The Court of Claims applied a similar rationale in Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d
1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
76. 103 S. Ct. at 2789.
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some executive and judicial functions but may not impair or assume a
power central to one of the coordinate branches.77 In looking at the veto
exercised in Chadha, Justice Powell found the House of Representatives'
action "clearly adjudicatory. 7 8
As Chief Justice Burger pointed out, this characterization of the legisla-
tive veto is not perfect.79 There are certain conceptual difficulties in de-
fining judicial, legislative, and executive powers.80 Determining whether
Congress has assumed a "central power" under Justice Powell's test is
even more difficult.8 1 Nonetheless, Justice Powell would not hold invalid
the legislative veto on purely procedural grounds, and his flexible stan-
dard offered some hope for congressional advocates of the veto. Unfortu-
nately for the veto advocates, Justice Powell failed to participate in the
subsequent review and affirmance of Consumer Energy Council8 2 and
Consumers Union,83 and his test was neither clarified nor rejected.
D. Dissenting Opinions
Two dissenting opinions were filed. Justice White objected to the
breadth of the decision84 as well as to the procedural basis for the opin-
ion, which he claimed ignored the overriding purpose of the constitutional
requirements.8 The doctrine of separation of powers, he argued, was not
violated where the veto served as a check on the growth of administrative
agency power.86
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, argued that the veto was
not severable from the rest of the clause in INA section 244 which grants
77. Id. at 2790. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976) (flexible limit in separa-
tion of powers doctrine expressed).
78. 103 S. Ct. at 2790-91.
79. Id. at 2787 n.21.
80. Cooper & Cooper, supra note 8, at 480-87. In a previous separation of powers case, the
Court attempted to draw a distinction between executive and legislative powers. According
to the Court, "Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to
make the laws, but not to enforce them or appoint agents charged with the duty of such
enforcement. The latter are executive functions." Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S.
189, 202 (1928). As Harris indicates, the line between these functions cannot be drawn
sharply, and it changes over time. However, as Powell suggests in his opinion, the applica-
tion of laws to an individual case, e.g. INA § 244 to Chadha, is clearly not a legislative
function, whether or not one characterizes it as executive or judicial. J. HARRIs, supra note
15, at 243.
81. Justice Powell recognized this problem and stated "[T]he more helpful inquiry, in my
view, is whether the act in question raises the dangers the Framers sought to avoid." 103 S.
Ct. at 2791 n.7.
82. 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
83. 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
84. 103 S. Ct. at 2796.
85. Id. at 2796-98.
86. Id. at 2809-11
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the Attorney General the power to suspend deportation.8 7 Chief Justice
Burger's majority opinion interpreted the words and legislative history of
INA section 40688 as allowing the suspension power to stand without the
veto.88 But in Justice Rehnquist's view, severing the veto provision would
also sever the suspension power provision. Justice Rehnquist theorized
that Congress would not have intended the executive branch to retain the
power to suspend deportation without congressional review.90 He con-
cluded that the effect of finding the veto unconstitutional would be to
deny the Attorney General the power to suspend deportation.
III. IMPACT OF Chadha ON THE REORGANIZATION ACTS
A. Validity of the Reorganization Act Authority
The executive branch reorganization acts contained the first examples
of the legislative veto. Until passage of the Legislative Appropriation Act
of 1932,1' the executive branch lacked authority except during wartime92
to create and alter executive agencies. A growing need was seen, however,
for increasing congressional delegation to promote administrative flex-
ibility, while retaining congressional oversight to prevent administrative
abuse.93 The 1932 Act provided President Hoover the first opportunity to
exercise this jealously guarded congressional power. The veto provision in
this Act, and in each of the executive reorganization acts since 1932, as-
sured Congress that some control over the structure of executive organi-
zation would remain with the members of Congress."4 The use of the veto
in executive reorganization acts thus was seen as a valid sharing of con-
gressional powers with the executive branch.9 5
After the 1932 Act, Congress granted the President reorganization au-
87. Id. at 2816-17. The general rule for determining severability is "that the invalid parts
of a statute are to be severed '[u]nless it is evident that the Legislature would not have
enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not."'
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976), quoted in EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 570 F. Supp.
1224, 1230 (S.D. Miss. 1983).
88. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982) (severability clause).
89. 103 S. Ct. at 2774-76.
90. Id. at 2816-17.
91. Ch. 314, 47 Stat. 413, 414 (1932).
92. For a discussion of how Congress assumed this power, see J. HARRIS, supra note 15, at
16.
93. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
94. J. HARRIS, supra note 15, at 204, 206-07.
95. See, e.g., Consumer Energy Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d
425, 458-59 & n.138 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (veto power under reorganization statutes seen as po-
tentially valid under "reverse legislation theory"), aff'd mem. sub nom. Process Gas Con-
sumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); J. CARTER, supra note
20, at 1 (veto avoids congressional intrusion into administration of ongoing substantive pro-
grams and preserves presidential authority).
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thority in 1939, 1945, 1949, and 1977.98 The 1949 Act was extended eight
times before lapsing in 1973.9 While the 1939 and 1945 Acts provided for
rejection of reorganization plans within 60 days by concurrent resolu-
tion,9 8 later acts in 1949 and 1977 gave Congress the right to reject plans
by simple resolution within a 60 day period."" A 1980 survey showed that
Congress rejected 23 presidential reorganization plans out of 114 submit-
ted between 1939 and 1979.100
The effect of Chadha and its progeny has been to call this entire pro-
cess into question. Although Chadha does not explicitly prohibit use of
the veto in executive branch reorganizations, it certainly raises a pre-
sumption of invalidity.10 1 The opinion of the Circuit Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia in American Federation of Government Employees v.
Pierce,10 2 a case following its opinions in Consumer Energy Council0 3
and Consumers Union,'04 casts further doubt on the validity of the veto
provisions in the reorganization acts.105 Although Pierce involved a com-
mittee veto over appropriations, 106 and not a one-House veto, the D. C.
Circuit dismissed without comment the "reverse legislation" theory it had
suggested in Consumer Energy Council, apparently closing the loophole
for executive branch reorganization acts.
10 7
Another post-Chadha decision, EEOC v. Allstate Insurance Co.,105
96. Reorganization Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-912 (1982); Reorganization Act of 1949,
ch. 226, 63 Stat. 203; Reorganization Act of 1945, ch. 582, 59 Stat. 613; Reorganization Act of
1939, ch. 36, 53 Stat. 561. See also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, STUDIES ON THE LEG-
ISLATIVE VETO, REPORT TO THE Stmcomm. ON RULES OF THE HOUSE Comm. ON RULES, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 164, 245 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as CRS 1980 STUDY].
97. Schwartz & Webb, Legislative Veto and the Constitution-A Reexamination, 46
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 351, 355 (1978). See discussion of first four extensions in J. HARMS,
supra note 15, at 209.
98. Reorganization Act of 1945, ch. 582, § 6, 59 Stat. 613, 616; Reorganization Act of 1939,
ch. 36, § 5, 53 Stat. 561, 562-63. See generally R. MOE, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION: A 1-hs-
TORiC Ovzviw 23 (Congressional Research Service Pub. No. 77-4G, 1977).
99. Reorganization Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C. § 906 (1982); Reorganization Act of 1949, ch. 226,
§ 6, 63 Stat. 203, 203.
100. CRS 1980 STUDY, supra note 96, at 245.
101. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
102. 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
103. 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
104. 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
105. In Pierce the Secretary of HUD (Pierce) appealed from an injunction prohibiting
him from carrying out a reduction-in-force within HUD. The HUD Appropriation Act pre-
cluded departmental reorganizations without the prior approval of the Committees on Ap-
propriations. In the course of reversing the district court injunction, the D.C. Circuit af-
firmed the invalidity of the legislative veto device. 697 F.2d at 304, 306-08.
106. Id. at 305-06.
107. Id. at 306.
108. 570 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D. Miss. 1983) (The 1977 Reorganization Act, found invalid in
its entirety by the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, in part transferred
Equal Pay Act enforcement from the Department of Labor to the EEOC.).
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found the entire 1977 Reorganization Act invalid because its legislative
veto provision violated the strict interpretation of bicameralism and pre-
sentment in article I. The court rejected any notions of independent sup-
port for reorganization act veto provisions and confirmed the broad appli-
cability of Chadha.10 9
The invalidation of the INA legislative veto in Chadha left the courts
with the question of severability. The question also arises in the context
of the executive reorganization acts. If the veto provisions are not severa-
ble from the reorganization statutes, then past application of vetoes to
executive proposals may be challenged. Even if the veto was not exer-
cised, past executive reorganization plans might be challenged on the ba-
sis that the statutory authority for such action was not severable from the
legislative veto. 10 This would call into question the statutory authority of
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Office of Management and
Budget, and ACTION, among others.""
One commentator has indicated that the absence of the veto will in-
crease tension and conflict between the branches of government." 2 He
predicted that Congress will react by refusing to authorize broad delega-
tions of power to the President in the future."' The loss of the veto
reduces legislative oversight. It could also lead to a loss of administrative
flexibility and slower responsiveness to urgent problems." 4
B. Possible Alternatives to the Veto
The initial reaction to Chadha among members of Congress was pre-
dictable. There were some initial statements in the Congressional Record
favoring and some denouncing the decision. 15 Several immediate propos-
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., id. The court there found that the legislative veto provision in the 1977
Reorganization Act was not severable from the remainder of the Act because Congress had
evidenced an intent to couple the delegation of reorganization authority with a one-House
veto provision. The absence of a severability clause and other evidence in the Congressional
Record were used by the court to justify holding the entire Act invalid. For further discus-
sion of the severability rule, see supra note 87.
The court in Allstate also found that considerations of retroactivity did not prevent the
court from invalidating a past reorganization plan submitted by President Carter and "ap-
proved" by Congress through non-exercise of the veto. Id. at 1232-33.
111. R. MOE, supra note 98, at 25.
112. Sundquist, Legislative-Veto Issue: Will it End in a Logjam?, Los Angeles Times,
Feb. 26, 1982, at 117, col. 1.
113. Id.
114. Id. See infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
115. For statements generally favorable, see, e.g., 129 CONG. REc. S10326-27 (daily ed.
July 19, 1983) (statement of Sen. Ford); 129 CONG. REc. S9670-71 (daily ed. July 12, 1983)
(statement of Sen. Goldwater). For statements made in opposition, see, e.g., 129 CONG. REC.
S11015-17 (daily ed. July 27, 1983) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
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als to alleviate the problem were made, including a constitutional amend-
ment to authorize one- or two-House approval of administrative agency
action11 and a proposal to submit all agency rules to Congress, where
adoption by joint resolution followed by presidential signature would be
necessary before the rules could take effect.1 7 Although the proposed
constitutional amendment would attempt to restore the status quo before
Chadha, the joint resolution devised to approve agency rulemaking
would, in effect, reduce the administrative agency to an advisory board. 18
A joint resolution requirement for executive reorganization authority
would require the enactment of each reorganization proposal by Congress
through the traditional legislative process.1 9 This method would reduce
executive branch flexibility and could seriously lengthen the process for
adopting such reforms.
Another and more promising alternative is the "report and wait"
method. The majority opinion in Chadha mentioned this alternative and
reiterated the Court's approval, based on previous case authority.12 0 Sena-
tors Levin and Kasten have taken Chief Justice Burger's advice by pro-
posing a report and wait provision in an amendment to the Federal Trade
Commission Act 2' and in a bill' 22 requiring review of agency rulemaking
under the Administrative Procedure Act. 23 Levin's proposal would allow
a 30-day review period by congressional committees. If either the House
or the Senate voted to submit a joint resolution of disapproval to Con-
gress, then the entire Congress would have 60 days to pass the joint reso-
lution. The President's signature would also be required before revoking
the rule. 24 The bicameral approval and presentment steps that are, by
definition, required for passage of a joint resolution would satisfy the pro-
cedural objections to the current legislative veto; the disapproval mecha-
nism would enable Congress to maintain a close watch over agency
rulemaking without requiring a lengthy, affirmative passage of each rule.
The application of the report and wait methodology to executive reor-
ganization proposals, in conjunction with other congressional review
116. S.J. Res. 135, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S11015-17 (daily ed. July 27,
1983) (proposal by Sen. DeConcini).
117. 129 CONG. REC. S10326-27 (daily ed. July 19, 1983) (Sen. Ford's discussion of Con-
sumer Product Safety Comm'n authorization legislation passed by the House).
118. Id.
119. See 129 CONG. REC. E3765 (daily ed. July 26, 1983) (statement by Rep. Levitas sup-
porting adoption of a regulatory calendar).
120. Immigration and Naturalization v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2776 n.9 (1983) (citing
Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 15-16, modified, 312 U.S. 655 (1941)).
121. See discussion of proposal at 129 CONG. REC. S11862 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1983) (sugges-
tion by Sen. Kasten).
122. S. 1650, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. Rzc. S10474-75 (daily ed. July 20, 1983)
(Agency Accountability Act of 1983).
123. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982).
124. S. 1650, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 129 CONG. REC. S10474 (daffy ed. July 20, 1983).
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methods,125 would remove any constitutional objections from the exercise
of congressional control over executive reorganization. The executive re-
organization plans already have presidential support; to defeat the reor-
ganization plan any joint resolution of disapproval would require Con-
gress to override the President's veto. This would be an obvious shift in
Congress' ability to control executive branch organization, and it is not
clear whether Congress is willing to give up its past control over reorgani-
zation. The report and wait method offers the compromise of continued
congressional oversight while preserving the flexibility necessary for effec-
tive presidential coordination of the executive branch.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Chadha opinion appears to have settled a 50 year dispute over
congressional authority to disapprove administrative action by legislative
veto. Chief Justice Burger's formalistic interpretation of the presentment
and bicameral requirements of the Constitution effectively eliminated any
use of the veto mechanism in future legislation. In addition to invalidat-
ing provisions in 56 current statutes, the Chadha opinion and subsequent
cases also raise the possibility of retroactive challenges to prior legislation
containing the veto.
The rationale followed in Chadha should greatly affect the method by
which executive reorganization takes place in the future. The veto provi-
sion in the Reorganization Act of 1977 is apparently invalid. Congress
must now find an effective substitute in order to oversee executive action.
Whether Congress reacts to Chadha by limiting the President's authority
to reorganize the executive branch or by adopting a report and walt
mechanism will likely depend on Congress' willingness to leave executive
branch organization to presidential discretion.
Peter M. Mellette
125. See generally Kaiser, Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives
to the "Legislative Veto," 32 AD. L. REv. 667 (1980) (survey of nonstatutory and statutory
controls). Kaiser lists several alternatives, including 1) statutory modification of agency ju-
risdiction over a subject matter through a) removal of jurisdiction, b) exemptions to
rulemaking authority, c) moratoriums on rulemaking, d) deregulation; 2) authorization re-
strictions on agency budgets; and 3) requirements for inter-agency consultation and review
before promulgation of new rules. Id. at 673-74, 687-89, 696.
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